This paper argues that corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures. Thus, corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental. In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state...

Motivated by recent examples of collective effort on the war on terror, we examine the incentives that retaliation may produce for the endogenous formation of an international counterterror coalition. We show that there are quite reasonable circumstances under which any nation that is a target...

The purpose of this paper is to apply existing knowledge to counter climate change. The contribution to knowledge is to ground institutional analysis, individual behaviour, political science, economics, management and the management of global sustainability in the practices and science of...

Professional economists rarely write on questions of genocide. This surprises because a workhorse tool of the economics discipline concerns the analysis of behavior that takes place under constraints. All parties in genocide—perpetrators, victims, and third parties—face cost and resource...

This paper extends Gupta (2010), which proposes a mechanism for the structuring of international institutions for the efficient provision of global security. In that paper, the level of threat by a rogue nation was assumed as being exogenously determined. This paper uses a similar framework to...

The 2012-13 Symposium Issue of the Penn State Law Review arose out of collaboration between two sections of the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) for the Annual Meeting in January 2013. The leadership of the Section on Trusts and Estates and the Section on Aging and the Law called for...

The purpose of this paper is to indicate how the knowledge of complex systems can be put into practice to counter climate change. A contribution of the paper is to show how individual behaviour, institutional analysis, political science and management can be grounded and integrated into the...

This paper is the first systematic examination of (counter)terrorism dynamic games with two types of externalities: temporal and spatial. We consider two types of non-cooperative behavior; one in which national authorities are sensitive with respect to the spatial spillovers of counterterror...