The paper develops a technique for studying incentive problems with unidimensional hidden characteristics. The technique supports a unified approach, which can be applied regardless of whether the type set is finite, the type distribution has a continuous density, or the type distribution has...

A monopolist sells goods with possibly a characteristic consumers dislike (for instance, he sells random goods to risk averse agents), which does not affect the production costs. We investigate the question whether using undesirable goods is profitable to the seller. We prove that in general...

We study general dynamic programming problems with continuous and discrete choices and general constraints. The value functions may have kinks arising (1) at indifference points between discrete choices and (2) at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we establish a general envelope theorem:...

We study general dynamic programming problems with continuous and discrete choices and general constraints. The value functions may have kinks arising (1) at indifference points between discrete choices and (2) at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we establish a general envelope theorem:...

We derive marginal conditions of optimality (i.e., Euler equations) for a general class of Dynamic Discrete Choice (DDC) structural models. These conditions can be used to estimate structural parameters in these models without having to solve for or approximate value functions. This result...

The solution to dynamic portfolio choice models can be formulated in terms of a value function by the Bellman principle of optimality, which reduces the multi-period optimal policy choice problem to a sequence of one-period maximization problems. For two adjacent periods, economists compute the...

This paper extends the Euler Equation (EE) representation of dynamic decision problems to a general class of discrete choice models and shows that the advantages of this approach apply not only to the estimation of structural parameters but also to the solution of the model and the evaluation of...

We offer a new proof of the maximum principle for optimal control problems with fixed endpoint. We allow for inequality constraints involving state variables and control variables. Our proof relies on an application of the envelope theorem. Nous donnons une preuve nouvelle du principe de maximum...

Dynamic models with inequality constraints pose a challenging prob- lem for two major reasons: Dynamic Programming techniques often necessitate a non established differentiability of the value function, while Euler equation based techniques have problematic or unknown convergence properties....

We study general dynamic programming problems with continuous and discrete choices and general constraints. The value functions may have kinks arising (1) at indifference points between discrete choices and (2) at constraint boundaries. Nevertheless, we establish a general envelope theorem:...