We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the...

Recently it is proved that all infinite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using this fact, and a technique suggested by L. S. Shapley for finite permutation games, we prove similar results for infinite permutation games. Infinite transportation games can be interpreted as a generalization...

In this paper interval bankruptcy games arising from bankruptcy situations with interval claims are introduced. For this class of cooperative games two (marginal-based) Shapley-like values are considered and the relation between them is studied.

We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy...

This paper addresses the question of how to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision maker who faces uncertainty. Several compensation rules for the decision maker are suggested and these are studied in a cooperative environment. Copyright 2006 Blackwell Publishing Inc..

In this note we represent a classical bankruptcy problem as a standard flow problem on a simple network and implement some known division rules from the bankruptcy literature via suitable cost functions in the related minimum cost flow problem.

In this paper we investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players and the rest of the players who do not cooperate and play a Nash game having multiple equilibria. Some properties of the partial cooperative equilibrium are studied and applied to a public goods situation.

This paper focuses on two characterizations of convex interval games using the notions of superadditivity and exactness, respectively. We also relate big boss interval games with concave interval games and obtain characterizations of big boss interval games in terms of subadditivity and exactness.