We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure can be characterized without the additivity axiom similarly as it was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our axiomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and...

The egalitarian solution for the class of convex TU games was defined by Dutta and Ray [1989] and axiomatized by Dutta 1990. An extension of this solution — the egalitarian split-off set (ESOS) — to the class of non-levelled NTU games is proposed. On the class of TU games it coincides with...

For cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU games) excess functions e : R2 ! R1 whose values e(x(S); v(S)); S N are relative negative utilities of coalitions S with respect to their payos x(S) = Pi2S xi are dened. The excess values for the class of two-person games are dened as those...