A mixed manna contains goods (that everyone likes), bads (that everyone dislikes), as well as items that are goods to some agents, but bads or satiated to others. If all items are goods and utility functions are homothetic, concave (and monotone), the Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes...

This note shows that the egalitarian Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for transferable utility games is self-antidual on the class of exact partition games. By applying a careful antiduality analysis, we derive several new axiomatic characterizations. Moreover, we point out an error in earlier work...

This paper examines several monotonicity properties of value-type interval solutions on the class of convex interval games and focuses on the Dutta-Ray (DR) solution for such games. Well known properties for the classical DR solution are extended to the interval setting. In particular, it is...

This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set [Branzei, Dimitrov, Tijs 2006) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility. This solution extends the well-known [Dutta Ray 1989] solution for convex games to arbitrary games. By deriving several characterizations, we...

This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (cf. Branzei et al. (2006)) as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility. This solution extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for convex games to arbitrary games. By deriving several characterizations, we...

A weakening of covariance property for solutions of cooperative games with transferable utilities - self-covariance - is defined. Self-covariant solutions are positively homogenous and satisfy a "restricted" translation covariance such that feasible shifts are only the solution vectors...