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We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance that include both new and traditional news media, from online and print newspapers to radio and television. News consumers are time-constrained and browse through news items that are available across competing outlets,...
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We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851323
There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remain ignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547096
This paper shows an equivalence result between the utility functions of secular agents who abide by a moral obligation to accumulate wealth and those of religious agents who believe that salvation is immutable and preordained by God. This result formalizes Weber's renowned thesis on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618057
We study an interactive framework that explicitly allows for non-rational behavior. We do not place any restrictions on how players can deviate from rational behavior. Instead we assume that there exists a lower bound p 2 [0; 1] such that all players play and are believed to play rationally with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011188510
Economic predictions are highly sensitive to model and informational specifications. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that, in static games with incomplete information, only very weak predictions, namely, the interim correlated rationalizable (ICR) actions, are robust to higher-order belief...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196334
We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330
By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level ℓ<sub>i</sub> about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019697