An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected … externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … example are cross-shareholdings between companies that compete in an auction. We derive an auction that coincides with the SPA …

; and rst-price, second-price, and all-pay auctions. Second, we establish revenue equivalence of these auction mechanisms in … auctions. Finally, we identify an optimal mechanism and its implementation by means of reserve prices in lottery and auction …

-unit, multi-bid uniform auction, modelled as a Bayesian game of incomplete information. At the auction each firm anticipates his … as their bidding strategies and it precludes the auction from generating a cost-effective allocation of permits, as it … would occur in simpler auction models. Auctioning tends to be more cost-effective than grandfathering when the firms' costs …

English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by …

financial markets. Three of these temporary programs relied on an auction mechanism: the Term Auction Facility, the Term …

issued debt. We use structural estimates of bidders private values to examine the effect of increased competition on auction … revenue. We compare bidder surplus before and after the auction. We find a small effect on the the surplus earned by bidders …