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Willingness to Fight on : Environmental Quality in Dynamic Contests

Liu, Haoming; Lu, Jingfeng; Salvo, Alberto - 2023

We show that the prevalence of prolonged tennis contests drops sharply when the ambient environment deteriorates through heat or pollution. We develop a multi-battle dynamic model to investigate how the disutility from a protracted competition shapes agents' willingness to fight on. Our theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014345053

Mistrust, Misperception, and Misunderstanding : Imperfect Information and Conflict Dynamics

Acemoglu, Daron; Wolitzky, Alexander - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

Building on theories of international relations, we analyze how mistrust (uncertainty about an adversary's preferences or capabilities), misperception (imperfect observation of an adversary's actions), and misunderstanding (non-degenerate higher-order beliefs) can lead to conflict and drive its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014372438

Cooperation Under Fear, Greed and Prison : The Role of Redistributive Inequality in the Evolution of Cooperation

Mantilla, César - 2012

This work offers an analysis of cooperation dilemmas making emphasis in the role of the unequal outcomes. Increases in … the benefit from leaving mutual cooperation are associated to the greed dimension, while increases in the cost from … cooperation dilemmas derived from the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma. Using two different frameworks, classical game theory and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014167899

Emergence of Long Run Behaviours in a Game Theoretic Setting with Host and Guest Populations : Residents and Tourists

Accinelli, Elvio; Brida, Juan Gabriel; Punzo, Lionello F.; … - 2018

In this paper we model tourism in the framework of multi-population dynamics and analyze the time pattern of its development through the evolving interaction between two populations feeding on a common space-resource. Each population might be structured in two (or more) "clubs" of members...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014210595

Dynamic Behavior and Player Types in Majoritarian Multi-Battle Contests

Gelder, Alan - 2015

In a dynamic contest where it is costly to compete, a player who is behind must decide whether to surrender or to keep fighting in the face of bleak odds. We experimentally examine the game theoretic prediction of last stand behavior in a multi-battle contest with a winning prize and losing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029170

Rebellion, Repression and Welfare

Vargas, Juan F. - 2010

I develop a dynamic model of social conflict whereby manifest grievances of the poor generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and the ruling elite, the relative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142041

Revealed Political Power

Bai, Jinhui H. - 2010

This paper adopts a "revealed preference" approach to the question of what can be inferred about bias in a political system. We model an infinite horizon, dynamic economy and its political system from the point of view of an "outside observer." The observer sees a finite sequence of policy data,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142466

Conflict and Deterrence under Strategic Risk

Chassang, Sylvain; Miquel, Gerard Padro i - National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) - 2008

We examine the mechanics of deterrence and intervention when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting, where coordination is easy, to those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different assessments of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005718537

An Evolutionary Game Approach to Fundamentalism and Conflict

Daniel G. Arce M.; Sandler, Todd - In: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 159 (2003) 1, pp. 132-132

This paper investigates the evolutionary equilibria of a clash of cultures game where conflict results from failures to share social power in individual pairings. Members of a general subpopulation are matched with those of a fundamentalist subpopulation, the latter being more cohesive and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823390

Starting Small and Commitment

Watson, Joel - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1999

the level of interaction growing over time. The types of players separate quickly. Further, cooperation between "good …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762785