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rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as … much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable … number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and, with one-second subperiods …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288120
Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010288136
Differential games of common resources that are governed by linear accumulation constraints have several applications. Examples include political rent-seeking groups expropriating public infrastructure, oligopolies expropriating common resources, industries using specific common infrastructure...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012149254
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003994144
rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as … much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable … number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and, with one-second subperiods …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921470
Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003921525
This paper presents a unified framework for characterizing symmetric equilibrium in simultaneous move, two-player, rank-order contests with complete information, in which each player's strategy generates direct or indirect affine spillover effects that depend on the rank-order of her decision...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378808
the evolution of cooperative behaviour in humans and other species. Many effective mechanisms and promotive scenarios have … cooperation research is presented, followed by two new objections to such an exclusive focus on PD-based models of social … cooperation themselves came to cooperate: Behavioural and/or psychological mechanisms which evolved for other, possibly more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009744105
interact, plays however a vital role in the evolution of conflicts. By relating the individual pay-off perceptions for each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009702311
Human players in our laboratory experiment received flow payoffs over 120 seconds each period from a standard Hawk-Dove bimatrix game played in continuous time. Play converged closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium under a one-population matching protocol. When the same players were...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658435