We show that the Shapley–Shubik power index on the domain of simple (voting) games can be uniquely characterized without the efficiency axiom. In our axiomatization, the efficiency is replaced by the following weaker requirement that we term the gain-loss axiom: any gain in power by a player...

This paper shows that there does not exist a social choice function that satisfies strategy-proofness, Pareto-efficiency and equal treatment of equals simultaneously, in classical exchange economies. This result establishes the incompatibility of fairness and efficiency in strategy-proof social...

Conditioning a monetary benefit on individuals’ family status can create distortions, even in individuals’ seemingly personal decisions, such as the birth of a child. Birth timing and its response to various policies has been studied by economists in several papers. However, pregnancy timing...

We identify a declining trend in the intergenerational mobility of men’s family income in the United States for sons aged 36-45 between 1997 and 2011, corresponding to fifteen successive rolling ten-year cohort-groups born between 1952 and 1975. Using PSID data to 2008, we first predict...

Kingston (1976) and Anderson (1977) show that the probability that a given contestant wins a best-of-2k+1 series of asymmetric, zero-sum, binary-outcome games is, for a large class of assignment rules, independent of which contestant is assigned the advantageous role in each component game. We...

Usury laws cap the interest rates that lenders can charge. Using data from Prosper.com (an online lending marketplace), I show how interest rate caps affect: 1) the probability that a loan is funded; 2) the amount a borrower requests; 3) the interest rate at which a loan is funded; and 4) loan...

In this paper, employing the political agency framework, we revisit the comparison between autocracy and democracy with respect to their effect on growth outcomes. We find that ability to replace an incumbent political leader through election is no guarantee in itself for the welfare superiority...