In this paper we discuss the necessity for an indirect approach to assess the growth and convergence prospects of ten Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC10). The necessity for an indirect approach arises for two reasons. First, the ongoing structural changes in the transition economies...

This paper offers a detailed assessment of the Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect in eight Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC8). Several features distinguish this study from others: First, we investigate a variety of specifications of extended models. Non-homogeneity of wages, deviations...

This essay reexamines the great contributions made by Dr. Ali Al-Gritly to Egypt. He was the finance minister for a short period at the beginning of the 1950s and later was appointed as chairman of the Bank of Alexandria. In 1966, he completed a book (Al-Gritly [1966 (1974)]) on the economic...

To achieve sustainable economic growth in the transition countries, it is crucial that enterprise performance is improved. However, it is not clear which factors are essential for this. On the basis of the empirical literature on potential determinants of enterprise performance in Russia,...

To achieve sustainable economic growth in transition countries, it is crucial that enterprise performance is improved. However, it is not a priori clear which factors are essential for this. For Russia, data to investigate the potential determinants of enterprise performance is scarce....

The paper provides an overview of the course of economic reform and the performance of the Russian economy since the early 1990s and an analysis of the structural reform challenges ahead. It assesses the contribution of institutional and structural reforms to economic performance over the...

This paper sets out a framework to analyse the interdependence of reforms in different policy areas during the transition process. It identifies four broad policy blocks related to liberalisation, stabilisation, exit and entry. The transition process in Slovakia is a case study of the striking...

It will be shown that for rational players with a sufficiently large time horizon it is advantageous to keep promises and not to cheat even if cheating is the optimal behaviour in the short run. This explains why ethics could develop in a market economy where incentives to cheat are ubiquitous.