The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This article investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of...

European economic integration leads to increasing factor mobility, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility of achieving, by means of voluntary matching grants, both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of...

This paper questions the effectiveness of matching grants to correct for interjurisdictional spillovers in the light of Bernheim general neutrality result. Indeed this result suggests that the usual argument that matching grants are needed to internalize the externality arising from the...

The European economic integration leads to increasing mobility of factors, thereby threatening the stability of social transfer programs. This paper investigates the possibility to achieve by means of voluntary matching grants both the optimal allocation of factors and the optimal level of...

This paper questions the effectiveness of matching grants to correct for interjurisdictional spillovers in the light of Bernheim general neutrality result. Indeed this result suggests that the usual argument that matching grants are needed to internalize the externality arising from the...