The successful foundation of entrepreneurial firms comprises a multitude of complementary human tasks. Within entrepreneurial teams, the effect of founders' human capital on firm success hinges on the information structure that prevails when nascent entrepreneurs are matched in partnerships....

We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with...

Innovative projects can be carried out by small entrepreneurial partnerships or within large industrial firms. We investigate the effects of fostering the former by organizing an quot;incubatorquot; to improve the matching of individuals in teams. The respective equilibrium then entails a larger...

We analyze a Tullock-type takeover contest between two CEOs. To deter wasteful influence activities in shareholder optimum, the parachute compensates the (potentially) foregone earnings of the contestant whose incentives to invest in such activities are strongest. Therefore, the parachute is...