Prior laboratory experiments have suggested that prices and expectations are flexible when firms' prices are strategic substitutes but sticky when they are strategic complements. I argue that the observed asymmetry is influenced by focal points in the participants' payoff tables across...

We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential...

We use laboratory experiments to test the ability of two self-assessment tax mechanisms to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly. Each mechanism requires a seller to declare a price at which he is willing to sell his property. The incentive to overstate the value is mitigated by...

We study the practice of self-control in an organizational social dilemma when the stakes are large, using 47 years of vital census data from 18th century Sweden. From 1750 to 1800, ninety percent of Sweden (the peasantry) lived in a simple-structure organization called a bytvång or village...

A substantial literature identifies seller holdout as a serious obstacle to land assembly, implying that eminent domain is an appropriate policy response. We conduct a series of laboratory experiments to test this view. We find that when there is no competition and no eminent domain, land...

We use laboratory experiments to test the ability of two tax mechanisms to discourage seller holdout and facilitate land assembly. In one mechanism (“revealed assessment”), if a seller rejects a developer’s offer, then the property value is reassessed to be equal to the rejected offer and...

We experimentally compare under-revelation of supply and demand across alternative variations of ascending and descending two-sided price clock auctions. We find that buyers reduce demand more when the price is ascending but sellers' behavior is consistent across clock directions. As a result,...

This paper experimentally investigates whether money illusion generates substantial nominal inertia. Building on the design of Fehr and Tyran (2001), we find no evidence that agents choose high nominal payoffs over high real payoffs. However, participants do select prices associated with high...

Our experiments refine and extend the work of Fehr and Tyran (2001), who suggest that money illusion can contribute significantly to nominal inertia in strategically complementary environments. By controlling for strategic uncertainty, visual focal points and cognitive load we find that...

We examine investment incentives and market power in an experimental market. We characterize market power as the strategic interdependence of subjects' investment decisions and output decisions. The market is designed so that investment and output decisions can be jointly characterized as...