In some experiments rational players who understand the structure of the game could improve their payoff. We bound the size of the observed losses in several such experiments. To do this, we suppose that observed play resembles an equilibrium because players learn about their opponents' play....

We present a general algorithm for computing the limit, as δ → 1, of the set of payoffs of perfect public equilibria of repeated games with long-run and short-run players, allowing for the possibility that the players′ actions are not observable by their opponents. We illustrate...

We propose that a simple “dual-self†model gives a unified explanation for several empirical regularities, including the apparent time inconsistency that has motivated models of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and Rabin's paradox of risk aversion in the large and small. The model also...

The philosophy of equilibrium refinements is that the analyst, if he knows things about the structure of the game, can reject some Nash equilibria as unreasonable. The word “know†in the preceding sentence deserves special emphasis. If in a fixed game the analyst can reject a...

In a repeated game with imperfect public information, the set of equilibria depends on the way that the distribution of public signals varies with the players' actions. Recent research has focused on the case of “frequent monitoring,†where the time interval between periods becomes...

In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles†to provide a...

We consider two kinds of ‘outside opportunity’ that a seller of an indivisible good might have: selling to a different buyer and consuming the good herself. In both models the seller is uncertain about the buyer's valuation, and becomes more pessimistic over time. When the seller...

We provide a characterization of the limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring as the discount factor goes to one. Our result covers general stage games including those that fail a “full-dimensionality†condition that had been...

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is...