A polluted river network is populated with agents (e.g., firms, villages, municipalities, or countries) located upstream and downstream. This river network must be cleaned, the costs of which must be shared among the agents. We model this problem as a cost sharing problem on a tree network....

This paper considers the cost sharing problem on a fixed tree network. It provides a characterization of the family of cost sharing methods satisfying the axioms of Additivity and the Independence of Irrelevant Costs. Additivity is a classical axiom. The Independence of Irrelevant Costs axiom is...

A river carries pollutants to people living along it if it is polluted. To make the water in the river clean, some costs are incurred. This poses a question of how to split the costs of cleaning the whole river among the agents located along it. To answer this question, we resort to the two main...

For a tolled highway where consecutive segments allow vehicles to enter and exit unrestrictedly, we propose a simple toll pricing method. It is shown that the method is the unique method satisfying the classical axioms of Additivity and Dummy in the cost sharing literature, and the axioms of...