Capacity mechanisms are increasingly used in electricity market design around the world yet their role remains hotly debated. In this paper, we introduce a new benchmark model of a capacity mechanism in a competitive electricity market with many different generation technologies. We consider two...

This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction...

This paper analyses the evolution of the bidding strategies of nuclear power plants on the Spanish day-ahead auction market, over the 11-year period from 2002 until December 2012. During that time the proportion of renewable energy especially wind and solar power increased dramatically. At the...

Horizontal shifts in bid curves observed in wholesale electricity markets are consistent with Cournot competition. Quantity competition reduces the informational requirements associated with evaluating market performance because the markups of all producers then depend on the same inverse...

Zonal pricing with countertrading (a market-based redispatch) gives arbitrage opportunities to the power producers located in the export-constrained nodes. They can increase their profit by increasing the output in the dayahead market and decrease it in the real-time market (the inc-dec game)....

This paper presents an extensive analysis of the Greek electricity market for the next 7-year period (2014–2020) based on an hour-by-hour simulation considering five different RES technologies, namely wind, PV, small hydro, biomass and CHP with emphasis on PV integration. The impact of RES...

Quasi-fiscal deficits of public utility companies are common in all member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). They constitute a significant impediment to efficient resource allocation and endanger macroeconomic stability. This paper presents a simple framework for...

In a real-time electric power auction, the bids of producers consist of committed supply as a function of price. The bids are submitted under uncertainty, before the demand by the Independent System Operator has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer chooses the...

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction — e.g. an electric power auction — under uncertainty, before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the supply function maximizing his expected profit given...

The concept of a supply function equilibrium (SFE) has been widely used to model generators’ bidding behavior and market power issues in wholesale electricity markets. Observers of electricity markets have noted how generation capacity constraints may contribute to market power of generation...