Similar Search Results

Verringern Management-Entlohnungskosten die Agency-Kosten? : empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen

Crespí Cladera, Rafel; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246

In the UK, the top executive remuneration policy is not geared towards the creation of value but compensation revisions are rather driven by changes in corporate size, measured by sales growth. This suggests that managing larger firms requires special managerial skills. Even in UK companies with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493782

Comment to: "Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten?" ; ("Do remuneration schemes reduce agency costs?")

Dilling-Hansen, Mogens - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 247

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010493783

Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten? : Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen

Crespí Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001596226

Total board compensation, governance and performance of Spanish listed companies

Crespí Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles - In: Labour : review of labour economics and industrial relations 17 (2003) 1, pp. 103-126

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001754186

Total Board Compensation, Governance and Performance of Spanish Listed Companies

Crespí-Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles - In: LABOUR 17 (2003) 1, pp. 103-126

In this paper we present empirical evidence on the relationship between board remuneration of a sample of large Spanish companies and a set of explanatory variables such as performance and size of the company. The objective is to provide additional empirical evidence based on the agency theory...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005139716

Verringern Management-Entlohnungskosten die Agency-Kosten? Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen

Crespi-Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010377541

Family-owned business succession : the influence of pre-performance in the nomination of family and nonfamily members ; evidence from Spanish firms

Bocatto, Eduardo; Gispert, Carles; Rialp Criado, Josep - In: Journal of small business management : JSBM ; a joint … 48 (2010) 4, pp. 497-523

Although family-owned business succession has been widely researched, very few studies investigate the relationship between preperformance and succession. Drawing on the agency and the resource-based view theories, we investigate how previous firm performance may influence the nomination of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008667968

Crash-based executive compensation in Spain and the UK

Crespí, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Corporate governance regimes : convergence and diversity, (pp. 647-667). 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001734117

Verringern Management-Entlohnungssysteme die Agency-Kosten? : Empirische Evidenz von netzwerkorientierten und marktorientierten Unternehmenskontrollsystemen

Crespi-Cladera, Rafel; Gispert, Carles; Renneboog, Luc - In: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 70 (2001) 2, pp. 234-246

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007488563

Family‐Owned Business Succession: The Influence of Pre‐performance in the Nomination of Family and Nonfamily Members: Evidence from Spanish Firms

Bocatto, Eduardo; Gispert, Carles; Rialp, Josep - In: Journal of small business management : JSBM ; a joint … 48 (2010) 4, pp. 497-524

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008704505