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When knowledge is not power : asymmetric information, probabilistic deceit detection and threats in ultimatum bargaining

Chavanne, David; Ferreira, Mark - In: Journal of behavioral and experimental economics 69 (2017), pp. 4-17

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011825113

Malleable lies : communication and cooperation in a high stakes TV game show

Turmunkh, Uyanga; Assem, Martijn J. van den; Dolder, … - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 65 (2019) 10, pp. 4795-4812

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012118130

Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision

Fehr, Ernst; Ederer, Florian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2007

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822257

The Effects of Consumer Protection on Sales Signs, Consumer Search and Competition

Wilson, Chris M. - EconWPA - 2005

-order’ monitoring can actually facilitate the deception of fully rational consumers, to deter them from otherwise optimal search …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412887

Biased Recommendations

Chung, Wonsuk; Harbaugh, Rick - Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, … - 2012

We develop and experimentally test a discrete choice model of an expert who recommends one of multiple actions to a decision maker who might take no action. Consistent with the recent theoretical literature on cheap talk recommendations, we find that recommendations are "persuasive" in that they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011096411

Deception and Incentives. How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision

Ederer, Florian; Fehr, Ernst - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, … - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005627981

Words, Deeds and Lies: Strategic Behavior in Games with Multiple Signals

Feltovich, Nick; Duffy, John - Department of Economics, University of Houston - 2004

We report the results of an experiment in which subjects play games repeatedly against changing opponents. In one treatment, "senders" send messages to "receivers" indicating intended actions in that round, and receivers observe senders' previous-round actions (when matched with another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005467357

The Effects of Consumer Protection on Sales Signs, Consumer Search and Competition

Wilson, Chris - Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia - 2005

-order' monitoring can actually facilitate the deception of fully rational consumers, to deter them from otherwise optimal search …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968079

Studying deception without deceiving participants: An experiment of deception experiments

Alberti, Federica; Güth, Werner - 2012

Banning deception in economic experiments does not exclude experiments with participants in the role of experimenters … who can gain by deceiving those in the role of participants. We compare treatments with and without possible deception by … experimenter-participants to test whether deception aects behaviour of participant-participants in a dictator experiment and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291812

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? An experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016

inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011580425