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How much you talk matters : cheap talk and collusion in a Bertrand oligopoly game

Lee, Jun Yeong; Hoffman, Elizabeth - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012243355

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011

Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914311

Do People Keep Socially Unverifiable Promises?

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011

experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371391

The contractor game: a theoretical and experimental analysis

Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick; Gurdal, Mehmet Y. - Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School … - 2013

and p = 0.5 along with the UG, played by some standard economic agents and others who are averse to inequity, lies and …, rather than punishing lies, compared to when no message is sent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010717398

Lying about Delegation

Sutan, Angela; Vranceanu, Radu - ESSEC Business School - 2015

This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185948

Economics as victim between lawyers and mathematics: An explanation for the tax credit, Bulgarian potential fraud, European unemployment and the economic crisis

Colignatus, Thomas - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

issue. (7) A root cause lies in the handling of economic science in Holland. Though other countries can already benefit from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109700

The Secret, the Sovereign, and the Lie: Reading Derrida’s Last Seminar

Barbour, Charles - In: Societies 3 (2013) 1, pp. 117-127

This paper takes up the question of secrecy and sovereignty in Derrida’s final seminar on <i>The Beast and the Sovereign</i>. Focusing primarily on Derrida’s readings of Lacan and Celan in <i>Volume I</i>, it argues that, for Derrida, we should distinguish between the lie (or what Lacan calls...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011029767

An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - In: Experimental Economics 16 (2013) 4, pp. 597-607

experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping … that communication increases the overall level of cooperation in our experiments with double-blind payoff procedures …. However, we also find no evidence that communication impacts cooperation in our experiments with single-blind payoff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010988990

Electoral control when policies are for sale

Farvaque, Etienne; Lagadec, Gaël - 2009

This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], Protection for sale, American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274511

Lying and Mistrust in the Continuous Deception Game

Beck, Tobias - 2020

receivers to disproportionally mistrust lies of such a high extent. This indicates that people make strategic considerations …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534490