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Do People Keep Socially Unverifiable Promises?

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011

experiments. This has been taken as evidence for internal motivations such as guilt aversion or preference for promise keeping …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371391

Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale

Farvaque, Etienne; Lagadec, Gael - CESifo - 2009

This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765809

Promises & Partnership

Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet - 2003

We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content of the communication? Which model of decision-making can capture the impact of communication? We consider...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645507

Are promises indebting? Political economy of electoral promises

Farvaque, Etienne; Lagadec, Gaël - Département d'Économie Appliquée (DULBEA), Solvay … - 2008

This article exposes the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596872

An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Deception and Telling Lies

Mishra, SK - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

others. Thus viewed, lies are the cardinal virtues for survival and, by implication, the carriers of evolution. In the human … to take up a definite moral attitude. Certain types of lies might be morally acceptable and socially beneficial since … they may block the otherwise (most damaging) global optimum solution of a negative sum game, while other types of lies are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498459

Comment on "Promises and Partnership"

Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011

Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914311

The contractor game: a theoretical and experimental analysis

Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick; Gurdal, Mehmet Y. - Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School … - 2013

and p = 0.5 along with the UG, played by some standard economic agents and others who are averse to inequity, lies and …, rather than punishing lies, compared to when no message is sent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010717398

The contractor game : a theoretical and experimental analysis

Anbarcı, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick; Gurdal, Mehmet Y. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211178

An examination of the effect of messages on cooperation under double-blind and single-blind payoff procedures

Deck, Cary A.; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 16 (2013) 4, pp. 597-607

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345921

Confessions of a radical reactionary : rhetoric and reality

Brown, Stephen - In: Journal of marketing management : MM 33 (2017) 9/10, pp. 858-872

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011746438