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Lying and mistrust in the continuous deception game
Beck, Tobias - 2020
receivers to disproportionally mistrust lies of such a high extent. This indicates that people make strategic considerations …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236528
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The game of lies by stock investors in social media : a study based on city lockdowns in China
Liu, Qing; Son, Hosung; Lee, Woon-Seek - In: Financial innovation : FIN 10 (2024), pp. 1-37
The potential hypotheses for fnance research based on social media sentiment revolve around the reliability of investor sentiment expressed on social media and the causal relationship between fnancial markets and this sentiment. The central hypothesis we focus on is derived from the "lie game"...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014541833
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Electoral Control when Policies are for Sale
Farvaque, Etienne; Lagadec, Gael - CESifo - 2009
This article analyses the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. It extends the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model [Grossman G., Helpman E. [1994], "Protection for sale", American Economic Review, 84, 4, 833-850] to include sanctions from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765809
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An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Deception and Telling Lies
Mishra, SK - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
others. Thus viewed, lies are the cardinal virtues for survival and, by implication, the carriers of evolution. In the human … to take up a definite moral attitude. Certain types of lies might be morally acceptable and socially beneficial since … they may block the otherwise (most damaging) global optimum solution of a negative sum game, while other types of lies are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498459
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Are promises indebting? Political economy of electoral promises
Farvaque, Etienne; Lagadec, Gaël - Département d'Économie Appliquée (DULBEA), Solvay … - 2008
This article exposes the dynamics of electoral promises, building on an electoral competition model with endogenous policies. This framework allows to deal with the intertemporal dimension needed to understand the prevalent cycle of promises, disappointment, new promises, new disappointment
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596872
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Promises & Partnership
Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet - 2003
We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content of the communication? Which model of decision-making can capture the impact of communication? We consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645507
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The contractor game: a theoretical and experimental analysis
Anbarci, Nejat; Feltovich, Nick; Gurdal, Mehmet Y. - Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School … - 2013
and p = 0.5 along with the UG, played by some standard economic agents and others who are averse to inequity, lies and …, rather than punishing lies, compared to when no message is sent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010717398
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Comment on "Promises and Partnership"
Deck, Cary; Servátka, Maroš; Tucker, Steven - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2011
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914311
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Lying about Delegation
Sutan, Angela; Vranceanu, Radu - ESSEC Business School - 2015
This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011185948
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Promises & Partnership
Charness, Gary B; Dufwenberg, Martin - Department of Economics, University of California-Santa … - 2006
promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others’ expectations in order to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011131677