We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show...

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies...

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. We show that if negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies are...

This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies...

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by...

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

First via a counter example it is shown that Proposition 3 of Anbarci and Sun (2013) is false. Then a gap and a mistake in their proof are identified. Finally, a modified version of their Proposition 3 is stated and proved.

This paper introduces two-player bargaining problems allowing for asymmetric subjective uncertainty about factors that determine whether agreement is achieved, focusing on surprising events, i.e. events believed possible by only one player. A `subjective Nash' solution is proposed, in which a...