We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogenous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a...

In the context of extensive form games, we are considering the relation between mixed and behavioural strategies. We look again at the famous Kuhn theorem and also discuss a result for games in which no path intersects any information set in more than one node. We apply the principle...

Two finite extensive-form games are empirically equivalent when the empirical distribution on action profiles generated by every behavior strategy in one can also be generated by an appropriately chosen behavior strategy in the other. This paper provides a characterization of empirical...

The standard model of an extensive form game rules out an important phenomenon in situations of strategic interaction: deception. Using examples from the world of ancient Greece and from modern-day Wall Street, we show how the model can be generalized to incorporate this phenomenon. Deception...

We construct a dynamic epistemic model for extensive form games, which generates a hierarchy of beliefs for each player over her opponents` strategies and beliefs, and tells us how those beliefs will be revised as the game proceeds. We use the model to analyze the implications of the assumption...

We consider a principal who is keen to induce his agents to work at their maximal effort levels. To this end, he samples n days at random out of the T days on which they work, and awards a prize of B dollars to the most productive agent. The principal's policy (B,n) induces a strategic game...

We use an extensive form, universal type space to provide the following epistemic characterisation of extensive form rationalisability. Say that player i strongly believes event E if i is certain of E conditional on each of her information sets consistent with E. Our main contribution is to show...

Consider a principal who hires heterogeneous agents to work for him over T periods, without prior knowledge of their respective skills, and intends to promote one of them at the end. In each period the agents choose effort levels and produce random outputs, independently of each other, and are...

This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed in terms of choices without any reference to infomation sets. When information sets are taken into account, it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets...

In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that ``better'' responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of ``worse'' responses --- most of Thompson's ``inessential'' transformations for...