In this paper we study non cooperative games with potential as introduced by Monderer and Shapley in 1996. We extend the notions of weighted and ordinal potential games to a multicriteria setting and study their Pareto equilibria. The importance of these games is the existence of Pareto...

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

Two logically distinct and permissive extensions of iterative weak dominance are introduced for games with possibly vector-valued payoffs. The first, iterative partial dominance, builds on an easy-to-check condition but may lead to solutions that do not include any (generalized) Nash equilibria....

Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are...

This paper considers a refinement of equilibria for multicriteria games based on the perfectness concept of Selten (1975). Existence of perfect equilibrium points is shown and several characterizations are provided. Furthermore, contrary to the result for equilibria for multicriteria games, an...

In this paper we investigate the existence of Pareto equilibria in vector-valued extensive form games. In particular we show that every vector-valued extensive form game with perfect information has at least one subgame perfect Pareto equilibrium in pure strategies. If one tries to prove this...

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix...