We study a general equilibrium model formulated as a smooth system of equations coupled with complementarity conditions relative to the <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$n$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-dimensional Lorentz cone. For the purpose of analysis, as well as for the design of algorithms, we exploit the fact that the Lorentz cone is...</equationsource></inlineequation>

We frame sustainability problems as bargaining problems among stakeholders who have to agree on a common development path. For infinite alternatives, the set of feasible payoffs is unknown, limiting the possibility to apply classical bargaining theory and mechanisms. We define a framework...

We frame sustainability problems as bargaining problems among stakeholders who have to agree on a common development path. For infinite alternatives, the set of feasible payoffs is unknown, limiting the possibility to apply classical bargaining theory and mechanisms. We define a framework...

We frame sustainability problems as bargaining problems among stakeholders who have to agree on a common development path. For infinite alternatives, the set of feasible payoffs is unknown, limiting the possibility to apply classical bargaining theory and mechanisms. We define a framework...

We present a new class of dynamic bargaining problems, called "bargaining problems with intertemporal maximin payoffs," that may reflect sustainability problems having to encompass conflicting issues in the long-run. Each bargainer (or stake-holder) has a representative indicator, namely a...