theoretical knowledge we present and compare seven properties of fair profit sharing. Findings: We show that the nucleolus is a … core-solution, which does not fulfil aggregate monotonicity. In contrast the Shapley value is an aggregate monotonic … solution but does not belong to the core of every cooperative game. Moreover, we present the Lorenz dominance as an additional …

A solution on a class of TU games that satisfies the axioms of the pre-nucleolus or -kernel except the equal treatment … property and is single valued for two-person games, is a nonsymmetric pre-nucleolus (NSPN) or -kernel (NSPK). We investigate … the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations to the positive prekernel and to the positive core. It turns out that any NSPK is …

We prove that both the nucleolus and the core-center, i.e., the mass center of the core, of an m-sided Böhm …-Bawerk assignment market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core-center of a convex game defined on the set of m … agents but one need to be taken into account. All these results simplify the computation of the nucleolus and the core …

We prove that both the nucleolus and the core-center, i.e., the mass center of the core, of an m-sided Böhm …-Bawerk assignment market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core-center of a convex game defined on the set of m … agents but one need to be taken into account. All these results simplify the computation of the nucleolus and the core …

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that … this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also … coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyerseller exact …