In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we consider a coalitional game, where the worth of each coalition is the total play in the game introduced in Ballester et al. (2006). We first establish that the game is convex. As a...

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers is known by all of them. Then two cooperative...

We introduce a class of cost-coalitional problems, which are based on a-priori information about the cost faced by each agent in each set that it could belong to. Our focus is on problems with decreasingly monotonic coalitional costs. In this class of problems, we study the effects of giving and...