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Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce a new type of tournament into the literature:...
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In the Yes/No game, like in the ultimatum game, proposer and respondercan share a monetary reward. In both games the proposer suggests a rewarddistribution which the responder can accept or reject (yielding 0-payoffs). Thegames only differ in that the responder does (not) learn the suggested...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866695
This paper analyses individual information acquisition in an ultimatum game with aprioriunknown outside options. We find that while individual play seems to accord reasonablywell with the distribution of empirical behavior, contestants seem to grossly overweighthe value of information. While...
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In a market with stochastic demand at most one seller can acquire costly information about demand. Other sellers entertain idiosyncratic beliefs about the market demand and whether there exists an informed seller. These idiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential insider's inclination to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014223844
We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014056577
We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666562
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008519855
In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n = 2) state-speciïfic assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090482