Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A <Subscript>1</Subscript>,A <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,A <Subscript> n </Subscript>, and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a <Subscript>1</Subscript>,a <Subscript>2</Subscript>,…,a <Subscript> n </Subscript>)...</subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript></subscript>

We consider a duopoly market in which two retailers with different reputation compete in prices and one of the retailers is considering selling through a new channel. Consumers are reputation sensitive and averse to the new channel. In addition, the reputation sensitivity and new channel...

Takeover and acquisition of corporations is awell-researched area and has been becomingincreasingly important. Much less research emphasishas been devoted to takeover activity within thegeneral area of financial services with thisparticularly the case for the building society sector. The...

A basic property of any normative theory of decision making --- individual or group --- is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic...

This paper characterizes modified evolutiona.rily stable strategies (MESSes) in Rubinstein's alternatingoffers, infinite- horizon bargaining game. The MESS concept modifies the idea of an neutrally stable strategy by favoring a simple strategy over a more complex strategy when both yield the...

We examine collaboration in a one-arm bandit problem in which the players' actions affect the distribution over future payoffs. The players need to exert costly effort both to enhance the value of a risky technology and to learn about its current state. Both product value and learning are public...