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for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of rationalizability are not robust. This negative result is obtained … settings this condition entails an unnecessarily demanding robustness test. It is therefore natural to explore the structure of … rationalizability when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions are relaxed (i.e., without assuming richness). For arbitrary spaces of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686699
for some arbitrarily close type. Hence, refinements of rationalizability are not robust. This negative result is obtained … settings this condition entails an unnecessarily demanding robustness test. It is therefore natural to explore the structure of … rationalizability when arbitrary common knowledge assumptions are relaxed (i.e., without assuming richness). For arbitrary spaces of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599487
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications … commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no … refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855899
This note characterizes the set A¡∞ of actions of player ¡ that are uniquely rationalizable for some hierarchy of beliefs on an arbitrary space of uncertainty. It is proved that for any rationalizable action a¡ for the type t¡, if a¡ belongs to A¡∞ and is justified by conjectures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979895
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications … commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no … refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010031
This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets … behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of … existing sufficient conditions for the robustness of equilibria. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762463
This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potentials for complete information games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008550229
This paper introduces the notion of nested best-response potentials for complete in- formation games. It is shown that a unique maximizer of such a potential is a Nash equilibrium that is robust to incomplete information in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997, mimeo).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002075
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159030
Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989)Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215306