We study and compare two frameworks : a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation...

We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under strategic equivalence, closedness (CLOS), the reduced game...

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have yes-no inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modelled by...

We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have "yes" or "no" inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence processes modeled...

In cooperative games, the core is one of the most popular solution concept since it ensures coalitional rationality. For non-balanced games however, the core is empty, and other solution concepts have to be found. We propose the use of general solutions, that is, to distribute the total worth of...

The implementation of Sustainable Development (SD) within an Organization is a difficult task. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to deal with conflicting and incommensurable aspects such as environmental, economic and social dimensions. In this paper we have used a Multi-Criteria...

Most allocation rules for network games presented in the literature assume that the network structure is fixed. We put explicit emphasis on the construction of networks and examine the dynamic formation of networks whose evolution across time periods is stochastic. Time-series of networks are...

The paper concerns a dynamic model of influence in which agents make a yes-no decision. Each agent has an initial opinion which he may change during different phases of interaction, due to mutual influence among agents. We investigate a model of influence based on aggregation functions. Each...

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to...

A game with precedence constraints is a TU game with restricted cooperation, where the set of feasible coalitions is a distributive lattice, hence generated by a partial order on the set of players. Its core may be unbounded, and the bounded core, which is the union of all bounded faces of the...