different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can … endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …

different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can … endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …

different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can … endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …

different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can … endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition …-serving behavior by political parties, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …

different beliefs about how policy choices will map into future economic outcomes. We show that when the incumbent party can … endogenously influence whether learning occurs through its policy choices (policy experimentation), future political competition … having conflicting objectives, but rather stems from their differing beliefs about the consequences of their actions. …

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in … which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the … strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of …

feedback as the main driving force of learning to play strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior …We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge … beliefs as well as for the accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent's true choice). In the baseline treatment we …