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Partage des coûts et tarification des infrastructures - Enjeux, problématique et pertinence du partage efficace des coûts

Boyer, Marcel; Moreaux, Michel; Truchon, Michel - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2002

La plupart des organisations, sinon toutes, répartissent d'une manière ou d'une autre des coûts communs entre leurs diverses composantes ou encore entre leurs différents partenaires. Ces problèmes de partage de coûts communs se posent avec de plus en plus d'acuité car les règles de...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100482

Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives

Paarsch, Harry J.; Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

enjoyed arose because of differences in ability, strength in our application. Nous étudions la réaction aux incitations pour …'habilité et une autre aux différences quant aux réponses aux incitations. Nous appliquons cette distinction aux travailleurs … individus sont hétérogènes quant à leur réponse aux incitations. Pourtant, bien que les femmes y réagissent sensiblement plus …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100605

Ex Ante Incentives and Ex Post Flexibility

Boyer, Marcel; Robert, Jacques - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1996

cerner l'arbitrage inéluctable entre incitations et flexibilité en situation d'information asymétrique. Nous caractérisons la …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100623

Inequity Aversion in Tournament

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

We consider the cost of providing incentives through tournaments when workers are inequity averse and performance evaluation is costly. The principal never benefits from empathy between the workers, but he may benefit from their propensity for envy depending on the costs of assessing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100711

Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude; Helm, Carsten - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2004

We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100739

Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

Data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment was conducted within a tree-planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both copensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100753

L'économie des organisations : Mythes et réalités

Boyer, Marcel - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1997

les incitations n'est ni simple ni facile. Nous considérons dans cet article l'analyse de ces impacts dans quatre …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100815

Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious

Demougin, Dominique; Fluet, Claude - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

les incitations à l'effort qu'elles engendrent. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100898

Optimal Justice in a General Equilibrium Model with Non Observable Individual Productivities

Lasserre, Pierre; Soubeyran, Antoine - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 1999

In this general equilibrium model, justice and police institutions are treated as a mechanism that induces individuals to extend some desirable productive effort. This determines individual encroachment activities which in turn determine the proportion of aggregate production that fails to be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100938

Compensation Policy and Worker Performance: Identifying Incentive Effects from Field Experiments

Shearer, Bruce S. - Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Analyse des … - 2003

The role of field experiments in evaluating the effect of compensation policies on worker productivity is considered. Particular attention is paid to the ability of a field experiment to identify the effect of a permanent change in firm policy. While field experiments solve endogeneity problems...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005100968