We examine how Big N auditors' changing incentives impact their comment-letter lobbying on U.S. GAAP over the first thirty-four years of the FASB (1973-2006). In particular, we focus on the influence of auditors' lobbying incentives arising from two basic factors: managing expected litigation...

We examine how the tightening of the U.S. auditing oligopoly over the last twenty-five years-from the Big 8 to the Big 6, the Big 5, and, then, the Big 4-has affected the incentives of the Big N, as manifest in their lobbying preferences on accounting standards. We find, as the oligopoly has...

I examine the extent to which the FASB’s agenda determination is a function of the contemporaneous priorities expressed by its primary constituents: auditors, preparers, and financial statement users. Using the FASB’s consultation with the FASAC as a lens through which to view constituent...

We examine the lobbying behavior of state governments and their financial statement users in the development of public pension accounting standards GASB 67 and 68. We find that states' opposition to liability increasing provisions is increasing in the severity of pension plan underfunding,...