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Favoritism in Contests: Head Starts and Handicaps
Kirkegaard, Rene - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2008
contestant may suffer from a handicap or benefit from a head start. The former reduces the contestant's score by a fixed … particular, a handicap does not "cancel out" a head start. The effort maximizing combination of head starts and handicaps is then … trade-off which implies that it may or may not be profitable to handicap the strong contestant. Indeed, the weak contestant …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168870
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Handicaps in incomplete information all-pay auctions with a diverse set of bidders
Kirkegaard, René - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 98-110
In many contests, a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729778
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On asymmetry in all-pay auctions
Yoon, Kiho - Institute of Economic Research, Korea University - 2012
This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641739
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Comparative Statics and Welfare in Heterogeneous Contests: Bribes, Caps, and Performance Thresholds
Kirkegaard, René - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2007
Comparative statics for contests with two privately informed and ex ante heterogeneous contestants are analyzed … part of the paper considers dynamic contests in which one bidder may endogenously be revealed to be weak. For example, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005040600
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Preferential Treatment may Hurt: Another Application of the All-Pay Auction
Kirkegaard, Rene - Department of Economics and Finance, College of … - 2010
In many contests a subset of contestants is granted preferential treatment which is presumably intended to be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008465788
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On optimal head starts in all-pay auctions
Seel, Christian; Wasser, Cédric - In: Economics Letters 124 (2014) 2, pp. 211-214
We consider a two-player all-pay auction with symmetric independent private values that are uniformly distributed. The designer chooses the size of a head start that is given to one of the players. The designer’s objective is to maximize a convex combination of the expected highest effort and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933286
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Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Pavlov, Gregory - 2013
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390055
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Jump bidding and budget constraints in all-pay auctions and wars of attrition
Dekel, Eddie; Jackson, Matthew O.; Wolinsky, Asher - 2007
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders.valuations. We analyze...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266326
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Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Pavlov, Gregory - 2013
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257
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Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions
Pavlov, Gregory - University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics - 2013
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835354