This paper develops an agency model in which stock-based compensation is a double-edged sword, inducing managers to exert productive effort but also inducing managers to divert valuable firm resources to misrepresent performance. We examine how the potential for manipulation affects the...

In countries with a weak legal system and a high level of corruption it has been shown that political connections are valuable to a corporation. This paper explores whether political connections are also important in the U.S., which has well-developed financial markets as well as a strong legal...

Firms targeted by Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions for fraudulent financial misrepresentation, on average, experience a significant drop in shareholder value. This paper highlights the additional impact of such enforcement actions on the shareholders of rival firms....

In this paper, we demonstrate that the performance of actively-managed equity portfolios varies cross sectionally with several portfolio scope characteristics. In particular, we show that performance (as measured by Jensen's alpha) increases when a larger fraction of the portfolio is...

In this paper we offer an explanation for the empirical anomaly that most raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally choose to...

Do informed shareholders who can influence corporate decisions improve governance? We demonstrate this may not be generally true in a model of takeovers. The model suggests that a shareholder's ability to collect information and trade ex post may cause him, ex ante, to support value-destroying...

How should one regulate a firm when its investment may cause a negative externality? In this paper we present a model on regulating a firm run by a manager and owned by a shareholder. The regulator can impose a penalty on the manager, the shareholder, or both. Our characterization of optimal...

Political news is known to be polarized, but standard explanations for polarization do not apply to financial news. Nevertheless, we find strong evidence of political polarization in the tone and coverage of corporate financial news. In particular, we find that the tone of corporate financial...

We present a model of financial media. In our model, firms strategically use the media to communicate corporate announcements to a group of traders, who do not observe announcements directly, but only through media reports. Journalists strategically select which announcements to report to their...

Using an event study, we examine whether the stock market considers corporate lobbying to be a value-enhancing activity. On January 3, 2006, lobbyist Jack Abramoff pleaded guilty to bribing politicians, which generated intense scrutiny of lobbyists, limiting their political influence. Using this...