This paper examines the link between bank competition measures and risk indicators using quarterly interbank exposures data for all banks in Mexico during 2008Q1-2019Q1. The classical literature focuses on disentangling the link between competition and individual bank solvency risk. In this...

Bank regulators interfere with the efficient allocation of resources for the sake of financial stability. Based on this trade-off, I compare how different capital requirements affect default probabilities and the allocation of market shares across heterogeneous banks. In the model, banks'...

This article focuses on the relationship between Fintech and bank risk-taking behavior. Since Robo-Advisor is one of the mature applications of Fintech, we found that the development of Fintech will have a greater impact on small and medium-sized banks through the establishment of a Robo-Advisor...

This unique study examines the interactive role of bank competition and foreign bank entry in explaining the risk-taking of banks over the globe. We used cross-country data for the banking sector from 2000 to 2016. Using the pooled regression model and Two-stage Least Squares model (2SLS with...

The lower levels of financial inclusion and severe financial inclusion gaps in Africa motivates the investigation of whether mobile phones, economic growth, bank competition and stability matter for financial inclusion. Data from 49 countries for the periods 2004-2016 were collected and analysed...

We exploit the introduction of free banking laws in US states during the 1837-1863 period to examine the impact of removing barriers to bank entry on bank competition and economic growth. As governments were not concerned about systemic stability in this period, we are able to isolate the...

We study a competitive banking sector in which banks choose the level of risk of their asset portfolios and, upon the public disclosure of stress test results, raise funding by promising investors a repayment. We show that competition forces banks to choose risky assets so as to promise...

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent...

It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this...

Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby,...