We experimentally test a game theoretical model of researcher-evaluator interaction à la Di Tillio, Ottaviani, and Sørensen (2017a). Researcher may strategically manipulate sample selection using his private information in order to achieve favourable research outcomes and thereby obtain...

We study the policy choice of an office-holding politician who is concerned with the public’s perception of his capabilities. The politician decides whether to maintain the status quo or to conduct a risky reform. The success of the reform depends critically upon the capability of the...

We show that robustness against model misspecification can account for the forward premium puzzle through a combination of an exchange rate model and a robustness model under structured uncertainty. In equilibrium, optimizing agents, who hold no misperception about the model, distort their...

Energy is the important source for the development of the society and it‘s the basic support of national economy and the base for human living. As the development of economy, abrupt increase of population and continuous improvement of living standards, the demand of energy increases...

We consider a two-agent hierarchical organization with a leader and a manager in a reputation-signaling model. The manager proposes an innovative but risky project to the leader, and decides whether to exert an effort to improve the value of the project, which benefits the organization. The...