De Meyer and Moussa Saley explains endogenously the appearance of Brownian Motion in finance by modelling the strategic interaction between two asymmetrically informed market makers with a zero-sum repeated game with One-sided information. In this paper, we generalize this model to a setting of...

We introduce the “relative diffuseness” assumption to characterize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and general action spaces can...

In this paper we test the effect of descriptive features on initial strategic behavior in normal form games, where descriptive are all those features that can be modified without altering the (Nash) equilibrium structure of a game. We observe that our experimental subjects behave according to...

The paper presents the concept of an "imitation equilibrium" and explores it in the context of some simple oligopoly models. The concept applies to normal form games enriched by a "reference structure" specifying a "reference group" for every player. The reference group is a set of other...

We provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identification region of the parameters θ in a broad class of incomplete econometric models. Models in this class have set-valued predictions that yield a convex set of conditional or unconditional moments for the model variables. In short,...

We study identification in static, simultaneous move finite games of complete information, where the presence of multiple Nash equilibria may lead to partial identification of the model parameters. The identification regions for these parameters proposed in the related literature are known not...