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In a preemption game, players decide when to take an irreversible action. Delaying the action exogenously increases payoffs, but there is an early mover advantage. Riordan (1992) shows that in a preemption game with two asymmetric players, players act in decreasing order of efficiency. This...
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This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261070
This paper analyzes pricing decisions and competition in network markets, assuming that groups of consumers can coordinate their choices when it is in their interest, if coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494335
This paper investigates pricing decisions and network choices in two-sided markets with network externalities. Consumers are heterogeneous in how much they value the externality. Imposing restrictions on the extent of coordination failure among consumers generates clear qualitative conclusions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010859070
Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010865832
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093925
This paper assumes that groups of consumers in network markets can coordinate their choices when it is in their best interest to do so, and when coordination does not require communication. It is shown that multiple asymmetric networks can coexist in equilibrium if consumers have heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094155