Little is known about the family firm as an economic entity except for the very few family firms that are public. Our paper describes a wide range of governance and finance characteristics in the population of all private and public family firms with limited liability. We find that the family...

We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5%...

We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder's equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict...

This paper first describes the institutional framework for corporate governance in Norway, concluding that its civil law tradition of Roman origin provides a relatively strong protection of shareholder rights. Using a data set which is exceptionally rich and accurate by international standards,...

Using unusually rich and accurate data from Oslo Stock Exchange firms, we find that corporate governance matters for economic performance, that insider ownership matters the most, that outside ownership concentration destroys market value, that direct ownership is superior to indirect, and that...

We examine rights issues on the Oslo Stock Exchange, where seasoned public offerings now take place almost exclusively through use of the relatively expensive standby underwriting method rather than unsinsured rights. We show that the propensity to use standby underwriting increases as expected...

This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information...

We uncover a positive relationship between firms' corporate governance quality, as measured by the degree of managerial entrenchment, and the quality of their real investment decisions. Firms whose managers are less entrenched invest more, invest more in line with their investment opportunities...

To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and whether ownership duration is related to firm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings over eleven years, we find that on average the firm's largest owner stays less than three years...