Die Erhebung, die Analyse und die Verwertung von Daten sind zentrale Treiber der digitalen Wirtschaft. Aber auch in Branchen, die nicht primär der Digitalwirtschaft zuzuordnen sind, nimmt die Bedeutung von Daten für den Unternehmenserfolg zu. Grundlage für eine effiziente Datenbewirtschaftung...

eBusiness-Standards ermöglichen die reibungslose inner- und überbetriebliche Kommunikation und sind damit die Enabler der Digitalisierung. Auch wenn Standards eingesetzt werden, kann es bei nicht flächendeckenden und interoperablen Standardeinsatz zu Friktionen kommen, etwa wenn eine...

Based on my recent work with several co-authors this paper explores the relationship between discretion, reputation, competition and entry in procurement markets. I focus especially on public procurement, which is highly regulated for accountability and trade reasons. In Europe regulation...

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment exploring the relationship between reputation and entry in procurement. There is widespread concern among regulators that favoring suppliers with good past performance, a standard practice in private procurement, may hinder entry by new...

One of the reasons why regulators are hesitant about permitting price competition in healthcare markets is that it may damage quality when information is poor. Evidence on whether this fear is well-founded is scarce. We provide evidence using a reform that permitted Dutch health insurers and...

In a market environment with random detection of product quality, a firm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince consumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a firm can rely on external certification of the quality of one or both of its products. We characterize...

We model non-binding retail-price recommendations (RPRs) as a communication device facilitating coordination in vertical supply relations. Assuming both repeated vertical trade and asymmetric information about production costs, we show that RPRs may be part of a relational contract,...

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...