An expert wishes to be approved by a receiver, who is outcome concerned. She then has an incentive to send an informative message. But if there is more than one expert competing for the receiver's approval and the latter doubts about the objectives of experts, they each have an incentive to make...

We propose a model in which different types of journalists have superior information to a newspaper's editor. Journalists compete for having their report published, but when writing their reports, they are uncertain about the preferences of the editor. We analyze the effects of competition and...

This paper studies the location decisions of political parties. We propose a game where agents vote according to ideology and valence, and media create candidates' charisma. The results we obtain show that candidates realize the power of media and therefore locate themselves at some point...

We present a model of participation in elections in small networks, in which citizens suÞer from cross-pressures if voting against the alternative preferred by some of their social contacts. We analyze how the existence of cross-pressures may shape voting decisions, and so, political outcomes;...