It is well known that a monopolist selling a single good, say a painting, can extract higher rents running an auction-type mechanism rather than posting a fixed price. In competitive markets, for example selling used books on line, price posting is often more prevalent than auctions. While...

We analyze the efficiency properties of price posting in a market where sellers compete for the buyers' business. They key feature of the approach is to investigate price posting as an equilibrium outcome even if sellers can compete with other mechanisms. When buyers are homogeneous, we show...

When firms choose the allocation of workers, they can adjust not only the type of worker, the extensive margin, but also the intensive margin, how many of those worker to employ. We propose a tractable matching model with such factor intensity. Positive sorting arises under...

Assortative Matching between workers and firms provides evidence of the complementarities or substitutes in production. The presence of complementarities is important for policies that aim to achieve the optimal allocation of resources, for example unemployment insurance. We argue that using...

We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative Matching between worker and firm types is positive or negative. In standard competitive matching models the wages are determined by the marginal contribution of a worker, and the marginal contribution...

We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether Assortative Matching between worker and firm types is positive or negative. In standard competitive matching models the wages are determined by the marginal contribution of a worker, and the marginal contribution...