This paper analyzes a bargaining model with incomplete information in which the time between offers is an endogenous stra tegic variable. It finds equilibria involving a delay to agreement th at is attributable to the use of strategic time delay by bargainers t o signal their relative strength....

This paper concerns the pattern of contributions to a joint project when commitments and enforceable contracts are not available. The authors analyze a game in which partners alternate in making contributions to the project until the project is completed. Contributions are sunk when they are...

A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time is most...

We examine a noncooperative bargaining between two agents, one of whom (agent 1) represents a constituency. Under "closed-door" bargaining, constituents must approve the final bargaining agreement. In the "open-door" case, constituents may also terminate bargaining after intermediate offers have...

We study a novel dynamic principal—agent setting with moral hazard and adverse selection (persistent as well as repeated). In the model an agent whose skills are his private information faces a finite sequence of tasks, one after the other. Upon arrival of each task the agent learns its level...