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Efficiency, welfare, and political competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358277
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Optimal democratic mechanisms for taxation and public good provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2008
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264838
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Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010398540
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Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix J. - 2008
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012724347
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Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition
Bierbrauer, Felix J.; Boyer, Pierre - 2021
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315596
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Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2008
We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772748
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Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition
Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - CESifo - 2014
We study political competition in an environment in which voters have private information about their preferences. Our framework covers models of income taxation, public-goods provision or publicly provided private goods. Politicians are vote-share-maximizers. They can propose any policy that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010779412
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The regulation of interdependent markets
Fiocco, Raffaele; Scarpa, Carlo - 2011
(centralization) or two (decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be partially captured by industry. Under … that centralized regulation is preferable. Under asymmetric information about the firms' costs, lobbying induces a unique … between the goods is high enough, the firms' lobbying activity may be so strong that decentralizing the regulatory structure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009267036
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Informative voting and the Samuelson rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010374864
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Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule
Bierbrauer, Felix; Sahm, Marco - 2006
We study the classical free-rider problem in public goods provision in a large economy with uncertainty about the average valuation of the public good. Individual preferences over public goods are shaped by a skill and a taste parameter. We use a mechanism design approach to solve for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333766