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Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
Müller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics Letters 129 (2015) C, pp. 116-120
When penalties for first-time offenders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat … prospect of a large fine for a subsequent offense. Now suppose the restriction on penalties for first-time offenders is relaxed …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263395
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Chapter 6 The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 1, (pp. 403-454). 2007
This chapter surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law—the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of the analysis addresses the following basic questions: Should...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023510
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Overdeterrence of repeat offenders when penalties for first-time offenders are restricted
Müller, Daniel; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Economics letters 129 (2015), pp. 116-120
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422056
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The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research … - 2005
This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law — the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009141806
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The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law
Polinsky, A. Mitchell; Shavell, Steven - 2006
This chapter of the forthcoming Handbook of Law and Economics surveys the theory of the public enforcement of law - the use of governmental agents (regulators, inspectors, tax auditors, police, prosecutors) to detect and to sanction violators of legal rules. The theoretical core of our analysis...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061267
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Status-seeking in violent subcultures and the double dividend of zero-tolerance
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2006
This paper develops a model in which individuals gain social status among their peers for being 'tough' by committing violent acts. We show that a high penalty for moderately violent acts (zero-tolerance) may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both moderate and extreme violence. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011348346
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The Effects of Racial Profiling, Taste-Based Discrimination, and Enforcer Liability on Crime
Mungan, Murat C. - 2020
profiling, causes a reduction in deterrence. These analyses, however, assume that enforcers' incentives are exogenously fixed … enforcement of laws, and to provide enforcers with incentives to minimize the impact of their discriminatory behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854274
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Optimal design of private litigation
Kaplow, Louis - 2017
This article translates and extends Becker (1968) from public law enforcement to private litigation by examining optimal legal system design in a model with private suits, signals of case strength, court error, and two types of primary behavior: harmful acts that may be deterred and benign acts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772058
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Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect
Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe; De Geest, Gerrit - 2016
Although a punishment can be applied only once, the threat to punish can be repeated several times. This is possible because, when parties comply, the punishment is not applied and can thus be used to support a new threat. We refer to this feature of sticks as the "multiplication effect". The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222949
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Incentive Contracts, Optimal Penalties and Enforcement
Gans, Joshua S. - 2000
This paper re-examines the literature on optimal penalties and the allocation of resources to enforcement from the … good and harmful acts, but can set incentives based on observed profits. When the agent is wealth constrained, it is … expected harm caused. This is because the imposition of high penalty levels causes the principal to dilute incentives for the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014156937