The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some … term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long …

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some … term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long …

simple model we explore how the power of elections as a selection device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds … than 50% for incumbents. …

simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote … thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote threshold makes it impossible for office-holders of low ability to pool with … average effort level tends to increase. The socially optimal threshold can be set by the public. Alternatively, one could …

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some … term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long …

This paper analyzes optimal re-election bars when incumbents gain socially valuable experience in office. We develop a … two-period model in which the output of a public good depends on an office-holder's effort, ability and experience. When … increases the expected effort over both periods and tends to raise the expected level of ability of office-holders in the second …

also increase effort. We show that the socially optimal vote-share threshold for incumbents is larger than one half …In this paper we introduce vote-share contracts. Such contracts contain a vote-share threshold that incumbents must …