result to remain in office for a second term. We assume there are learningby- doing effects for incumbents and show that …-share contracts improve the average ability level of a reelected politician and increase effort in the first term of an incumbent. On …

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

result to remain in office for a second term. We assume there are learningby- doing effects for incumbents and show that …-share contracts improve the average ability level of a reelected politician and increase effort in the first term of an incumbent. On …

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts, a novel instrument, on elections, policies, and welfare. We …

We examine the effects of a novel political institution, which we call Coalition- Preclusion Contracts, on elections …, policies, and welfare. Coalition-Preclusion Contracts enable political parties to credibly commit before the elections not to … form a coalition after the elections with one or several other parties specified in the contract. We consider a political …