In this paper we study situations where agents who are divided in hierarchical classes have restricted possibilities for communication. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values with weight systems (Kalai and...

In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to several equilibrium concepts. We find that essentially no cycles will...

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...

A new class of cooperative multicriteria games is introduced which takes into account two different types of criteria: private criteria, which correspond to divisible and excludable goods, and public criteria, which in an allocation take the same value for each coalition member. The different...